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“That the people of England, being at this day very unequally distributed by Counties, Cities, and 
Boroughs for the election of their deputies in Parliament, ought to be more indifferently 
proportioned according to the number of the inhabitants; the circumstances whereof for number, 
place, and manner are to be set down before the end of this present Parliament.” 
   
         John Lilburne, 1647 
 
 
Historical Frequency of “Unpopular” Elections 
 
In the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush was elected by winning the electoral vote 
although Al Gore received the most popular votes. While this possibility, which we shall call an 
“unpopularly elected president”, had always been recognized, it suddenly passed from an event 
not seen in anyone’s lifetime and which might have been dismissed as highly unlikely, to an 
actual modern day occurrence that brought criticism of our democratic institutions, especially the 
Electoral College. Many felt the disagreement between popular vote and electoral vote was not 
fair or democratic—it had violated the notion of “one man, one vote”. The smaller number of 
popular votes that Bush received were said to have counted for more than Gore’s total, which 
exceeded Bush’s by roughly one half million votes--yet Bush won the Electoral College vote. 
(One of the electors pledged to Gore did not vote for Gore and so the actual result was 271-266.)    
 
The dissatisfaction with the discrepancies between the Electoral College outcome and the popular 
vote that occur form time to time has spawned a movement in support of The National Popular 
Vote Bill [http://www.nationalpopularvote.com], which would effectively guarantee the 
Presidency to the winner of the national popular vote once enough states adopt the bill to 
guarantee victory for the national popular winner. In that case the adopting states then award all 
their electors to the national popular winner. As of May 2011 the bill had been adopted in nine 
states representing 49% of  the electoral votes needed to activate it.  
 
Gallup polls dating as far back as 1944 have consistently shown only about 20% of the public 
supporting the current electoral system and about 70% opposed. Recent surveys have found more 
than 70% favor a direct nationwide election of the President. While the public’s feelings about the 
appropriateness of the Electoral College system may have been intensified by recent elections, 
instances where the winner of the Presidency did not win at least a plurality of the popular vote 
are in fact common in our nation’s history: 
 
1. In 1824, John Quincy Adams was elected with 32% of the popular vote and only 84 
out of a total of 261 electoral votes while Andrew Jackson won 42% of the popular vote 
and 99 electoral votes. Two other candidates, William Crawford and Henry Clay, 
received 41 and 37 electoral votes respectively.  The U.S. Constitution requires a 
majority, not just a plurality, of Electoral College votes for a candidate to become 
president. In case no candidate has a majority of the Electoral College votes the U.S. 
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Constitution prescribes that the House of Representatives decides among the top three 
electoral vote finishers; each state has only one vote in the matter. On the first ballot in 
the House Adams won 13 states to Jackson’s seven and Clay’s four.   
 
2. In 1876 Rutherford B. Hayes (Republican) became President with 48% of the 
popular vote and 185 electoral votes while Samuel J. Tilden (Democrat) won 51% of 
the popular vote but only 184 electoral votes. Interestingly, the apportionment of the 
House of Representatives following the previous (1870) census was not carried out 
according to the accepted apportionment method of the time (known as Hamilton’s 
method) or any other recognized method and represented a compromise reached in the 
House. If Hamilton’s method had been used, as was the law at the time, Tilden would 
have won the Electoral College vote by one vote.  
 
3. In 1888, Benjamin Harrison (Republican) became President with 48% of the popular 
vote and 233 electoral votes while incumbent Grover Cleveland (Democrat) received  
49% of the popular vote but just 168 electoral votes. 
 
4. Most recently George W. Bush was elected in 2000 with 271 electoral votes to Al 
Gore’s 266 while receiving roughly one half million fewer popular votes than Gore.  
 
5.  A rather ambiguous example occurred in 1960 when John F. Kennedy defeated 
Richard M. Nixon by 84 Electoral votes. Due to a complicated situation in Mississippi 
and Alabama regarding unpledged delegates on the ballot, there is some question about 
how to properly count popular votes for Kennedy in these states. (See the article by 
Gaines in Further Reading for a discussion of this election and the difficulty in listing 
vote counts for Kennedy.) It has been argued that votes for these unpledged delegates 
should not be credited as popular votes for Kennedy, in which case Kennedy did not 
win a plurality of the popular vote. 
 
Thus for the 58 presidential elections that have taken place since 1780, at least four unpopular 
elections—nearly 7%—have occurred. If we include the 1960 election, fully 8.6% of all 
American presidential elections have been unpopular.  
 
Estimates based on the historical record do not necessarily provide good predictions of the 
likelihood of an unpopular result in a future election because the sample size involved in these 
estimates is small, and because the political structure has changed dramatically many times in 
United States history. A more effective way to estimate the likelihood of a future unpopular 
election is to use the Monte Carlo method: simulate a large number of elections using a suitable 
randomization approach and then compute the percentage that result in unpopularly elected 
presidents, using as input data an appropriate set of recent presidential elections.  
 
 
Structure of the Electoral College 
 
The number of electors for each state is the number of representatives for that state, plus two 
more for the Senate seats. The House size was set at 435 in 1911 and has not been changed since 
then. The District of Columbia was granted three electoral votes in 1961 by the 23rd Amendment, 
thus there are currently 435 + 50 × 2 + 3  = 538 members of the Electoral College and this has 
been so for the last 12 presidential elections, starting in 1964. We regard District of Columbia as 
a state for the purposes of this article, which results in 102 “Senate” electors and 436 “House” 
electors.  
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Simulating Presidential Elections 
 
For the purposes of this study we awarded fixed numbers of electors using the “winner take all” 
method in all states even though two states, Nebraska and Maine, do otherwise. Since together 
they have only nine electoral votes and usually all electoral votes go to the same candidate in both 
states, this simplifying assumption does not greatly influence the validity of our model.  We 
based our simulations on the data for the last twelve presidential elections (1964 through 2008) to 
avail ourselves of the fullest history that represents current conditions.  
 
One might wonder if, for example, the political dynamics of the Nixon versus Kennedy election 
are significantly different than more recent elections and so the elections from many years ago 
might not be germane to our analysis. With this in mind we ran several simulations that began in 
election years later than 1964. The results for these other analyses were similar, so we do not 
provide those results here. We excluded votes for third party candidates and regard each potential 
election as between a Republican and a Democrat. All of the data we use was taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States, published by the US Census Bureau.  
 
One simple idea for simulating elections is to choose for each of the 51 “states” with equal 
likelihood, one of the past twelve elections. Then using that year’s percentages of votes for 
Democrats and Republicans out of the total votes cast for those two parties, determine which 
party receives the resulting electoral votes. Next, multiply these percentages by current voting 
population figures for that state to obtain the popular votes for each party for that state. Summing 
this procedure over all states provides the electoral and popular vote totals for one simulated 
election.  
 
This simulation method is unsatisfactory, however; while it will reproduce the state marginal 
distributions of the actual data, the joint distribution will be the product of these 51 marginal 
distributions. However the actual election data is not independent from one state to another, but in 
fact is highly correlated; for example, the southern states east of Texas often vote in much the 
same way and in so doing have had a strong voice in determining the president.  Other, less 
geographically connected states also have highly correlated voting patterns, as seen in Figure 1. 
Over half of the state-to-state correlations for the 1964-2008 election records are above 0.70; this 
reflects the substantial dependency that exists among state voting patterns. To adequately 
simulate presidential elections, this dependency must be take into account. 
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Figure 1. Many state voting patterns exhibit strong positive correlation. 
 
 
We incorporated the historical correlation between states’ voting patterns by means of principal 
components analysis. (See the Appendix for a description of principal components analysis and 
details of how we implemented it for this study.) We represented the data from the last twelve  
r = 0.98 r = 0.91 r = 0.97 
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elections as twelve 51-dimensional vectors of measurements, where the 51 components consisted 
of each state’s percentage of votes for the Democratic candidate out of the total of Republican 
and Democratic votes. We used the eigenvectors and eigenvalues generated by the principal 
component analysis to compute simulated percentages of Republican and Democratic votes for 
each state as follows: 
 
Let λj, j = 1, …, 11 represent the non-zero eigenvalues of the sample covariance matrix of the 
data and let Ej, j = 1, …, 11 be the corresponding eigenvectors. Also let  zj, for j = 1, …, 11 be 
independent normally distributed random variables with mean zero and variance one. Then a 
simulated vector of state election percentages is generated by the formula  
 
∑+
=
11
1j jjj
Ez λµ
 . 
This method generates multivariate normal 51-dimensional vectors with mean vector and 
variance-covariance matrix matching that of the actual data for the past twelve elections. Note 
that jλ represents the standard deviation of the data in the direction of the eigenvector cj; 
scaling by this factor thus gives each eigenvector the proper weight in the random linear 
combination above. Multiplying the simulated state percentages by the numbers of voters in each 
state in 2008 gives simulated popular vote totals, which then determine electoral votes awarded to 
each party. Each new generation of eleven independent standard normal random variables {zj, j = 
1, …, 11} gives a different simulated election.  
 
 
The values of the eleven principal components are listed in Table 1. Their sizes diminish rapidly, 
indicating that the data structure is dominated by the first few eigenvectors (especially the first 
two or three) and that the impact of the last several principal components is relatively 
unimportant.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0.2217 0.0512 0.0316 0.0109 0.0086 0.0063 0.0039 0.0033 0.0019 0.0006 0.0004 
 
Table 1. Eigenvalues of the non-zero eigenvectors. 
 
A side benefit of using principal components to simulate presidential elections is that insights into 
the structure of recent presidential election history are gained. In Table 2 the coefficients (or 
coordinates) for each state for each of the first three principal components have been sorted by 
size and listed next to their state name. These show the contribution of each state to the given 
factor. The eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue represents the direction of 
maximal variation of the set of twelve points in 51-dimensional space, and the corresponding 
eigenvalue in Table 1 is the amount of variation (variance) in that direction. 
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eigenvec1 state eigenvec2 state eigenvec3 state
−0.0238415 Mississippi −0.121403 California −0.260707 Vermont
0.0186228 Alabama −0.116453 Alaska −0.248836 Jersey New
0.0452776 DC −0.0919417 Vermont −0.2418 Mississippi
0.0701703 Carolina South −0.0881028 Hampshire New −0.185957 DC
0.0799757 Louisiana −0.0829933 Oregon −0.178365 Illinois
0.0871298 Dakota South −0.0794905 Colorado −0.166086 Delaware
0.0895441 Minnesota −0.0764787 Massachusetts −0.16361 New York
0.0902731 Georgia −0.0749953 Utah −0.142217 Connecticut
0.100288 Wisconsin −0.0740215 Connecticut −0.135817 Florida
0.110931 Tennessee −0.0713542 Dakota North −0.129319 Maryland
0.111254 Iowa −0.0688837 Nevada −0.114116 Hampshire New
0.119318 Oregon −0.0663339 Dakota South −0.112617 Arizona
0.119699 Montana −0.0660958 Iowa −0.0940777 Nevada
0.119978 Kansas −0.0633663 Nebraska −0.0928782 Hawaii
0.122596 Indiana −0.0579008 Michigan −0.0863222 California
0.126893 Carolina North −0.0531243 Montana −0.0782796 Washington
0.127318 Virginia −0.0523939 Hawaii −0.0766953 Mexico New
0.128131 Arizona −0.0484016 Wisconsin −0.0757859 Virginia
0.129364 Kentucky −0.0472812 Washington −0.0730579 Maine
0.129483 Pennsylvania −0.0389907 Mexico New −0.0416486 Michigan
0.130103 Idaho −0.0357221 Idaho −0.0338265 Massachusetts
0.130325 Nebraska −0.033154 New York −0.0301716 Carolina South
0.132685 Illinois −0.0300273 Island Rhode −0.0263555 Island Rhode
0.132848 Dakota North −0.0284695 Illinois −0.0138041 Colorado
0.133248 Ohio −0.0247437 Arizona −0.00946684 Alabama
0.136501 Washington −0.012697 Wyoming −0.00908988 Louisiana
0.139055 Virginia West −0.00979605 Pennsylvania −0.00258206 Oregon
0.141333 Missouri −0.008557 Ohio 0.00597628 Wisconsin
0.142502 Arkansas 0.000857517 Maine 0.00932561 Iowa
0.142899 Mexico New 0.00100859 Jersey New 0.00988972 Pennsylvania
0.143523 Texas 0.00202122 DC 0.0219484 Ohio
0.14354 Wyoming 0.00742675 Indiana 0.0324945 Indiana
0.144142 Alaska 0.0128174 Delaware 0.0367796 Georgia
0.144723 Maryland 0.017701 Maryland 0.0440678 Carolina North
0.145804 Florida 0.0188452 Kansas 0.073195 Tennessee
0.146466 Delaware 0.0310493 Minnesota 0.0743097 Minnesota
0.149133 Michigan 0.0336506 Missouri 0.0877877 Missouri
0.149201 Oklahoma 0.0637789 Virginia 0.097551 Nebraska
0.151662 Massachusetts 0.0657446 Texas 0.124997 Arkansas
0.154299 Utah 0.0887935 Kentucky 0.132984 Kansas
0.158538 Colorado 0.113207 Oklahoma 0.160389 Montana
0.165692 New York 0.123198 Florida 0.160393 Idaho
0.169652 California 0.136418 Virginia West 0.166403 Dakota North
0.172565 Nevada 0.139861 Carolina North 0.171023 Dakota South
0.173609 Connecticut 0.175465 Tennessee 0.185169 Oklahoma
0.18331 Island Rhode 0.257683 Carolina South 0.20485 Utah
0.184728 Maine 0.261201 Louisiana 0.222316 Texas
0.190381 Vermont 0.279381 Arkansas 0.222965 Kentucky
0.202345 Hampshire New 0.380418 Georgia 0.241793 Virginia West
0.220533 Hawaii 0.396645 Alabama 0.267344 Wyoming
0.222753 Jersey New 0.501711 Mississippi 0.277031 Alaska
 
 
Table 2. Coefficients of the first three eigenvectors sorted by size.  
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Note that for all but one state, Mississippi, the coefficients of the first principal component, 
eigenvec1, have the same sign.  This reflects the fact that almost all of the states have tended to 
vote together overall. This makes sense since a candidate who wins in a landslide will tend to 
receive a higher proportion of votes in nearly every state than will a candidate in a closer election. 
The highest positive coefficients of the second principal component, eigenvec2, are all southern 
states, confirming notions that their behavior is correlated and tends to be different from that of 
the remaining states. The second most significant factor in the past twelve elections is therefore 
the southern/non-southern political axis.  
 
Finally, the third principal component, eigenvec3, appears to separate urban and rural states to 
some degree. These first three factors (overall popularity, southern vs. non-southern support, 
urban vs. rural support) explain fully 88% of the variation in the data (computed from the sum of 
the 1st three eigenvalues divided by the sum of all of them). 
 
 
Estimated Frequency of Unpopular Elections 
 
The primary goal of our simulation study was to estimate the frequency of unpopular elections 
under reasonably current conditions. We used the principal components approach to generate 
20,000 trials and found a 4.9% frequency of unpopular elections. Although the estimated 
likelihood of an unpopular election suggests that such an outcome would occur on average only 
once every eighty years, the fact that there have already been at least four such outcomes in our 
nation’s history suggests that the issue is nevertheless an important one.  
 
The Democratic candidate won 44% of the simulated elections and the Republican candidate won 
56%, which closely matches the actual proportions for the 1964-2008 elections, of which 
Democrats won five and Republicans seven. This provides confirming evidence that our 
simulation approach reflects presidential voting patterns for the period 1964-2008. 
  
 
Effect of Awarding Senate Electors to Each State   
 
When the founding fathers designed our electoral voting system, they decided to award each state 
two electors (representing their two senators) in addition to the electors they received according 
to their representation in the House of Representatives. The examples in Table 3 below show how 
“unpopular” outcomes can occur both (i) without and (ii) with the extra Senate electors in the 
Electoral College. We describe each case by a two place code in which in the first position 
indicates whether the popular winner wins (W) or loses (L) the sum of the House and Senate 
electors (our present electoral system), and the second position indicates whether the popular 
winner wins (W) or loses (L) the majority of House electors only. 
 
For simplicity let’s pretend there are only three states having populations of 300, 100 and 100 and 
they are apportioned to have three, one and one House seats respectively. After adding the Senate 
electors they then have five, three and three electors. In all scenarios below, A wins the popular 
vote.  
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            LW, unpopular election “caused” by Senate electors 
 
  
      House + Senate   House 
   Popular Vote   Electoral Votes   Electoral Votes 
 State A's % A B   A B   A B 
1 53% 159 141   5     3   
2 47% 47 53     3     1 
3 47% 47 53     3     1 
Total 
  
253 247   5 6   3 2 
           
 
         
 
               LL, unpopular election using either method 
 
   
      House + Senate   House  
    Popular Vote   Electoral Votes   Electoral Votes 
State  A's % A B   A B   A B 
1 49% 147 153   
  
5   
  
3 
2 49% 49 51   
  
3   
  
1  
3 65% 65 35   3     1 
  
Total 
  
261 239   3 8   1 4 
 
         
 
         
 
WL, Unpopular election only when using only House electors 
 
 
      House + Senate   House  
    Popular Vote   Electoral Votes   Electoral Votes 
State A's % A B   A B   A B 
1 49% 147 153     5     3 
2 53% 53 47   3     1   
3 53% 53 47   3     1   
Total 
  
253 247   6 5   2 3 
 
Table 3. Simplified scenarios yielding different unpopular results. 
 
 
In the first scenario, LW (like the Bush versus Gore election), candidate A wins the popular vote 
and loses the electoral vote with both House and Senate electors and wins the electoral vote 
without Senate electors This election turned out unpopular with both House and Senate electors 
counted because: (i) the margin of victory/defeat is the same in all three states and A wins the 
large state, which has a larger population than the other two states combined, so A wins the 
popular vote; and (ii) B triumphs in the Electoral College because B is rewarded for winning 
more states.  
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In the second scenario, LL, A wins the popular vote and loses both the full vote of the Electoral 
College (with Senate electors) and the House electoral vote alone. The reason this occurs is that 
A’s margin of defeat in States 1 and 2 is slight, therefore A still wins the popular vote; but losing 
two states gives the majority of electoral votes to B, with or without the Senate electors.  
 
In the third scenario, WL, A closely loses State 1 but wins more substantially in the other two 
states, so that A wins the popular vote but loses when the two states’ Senate electors are not 
counted.  
 
Clearly we can have disagreement between popular winner and electoral winner whether we 
include the Senate electors in the Electoral College or not. If a candidate wins many states by a 
narrow popular vote margin while losing others by large margins, it is certainly possible for that 
candidate to be “unpopularly elected” with a minority of the popular vote. Thus unpopular 
presidents will inevitably occur with a “winner take all” system for the states (as the U.S. 
currently has with the exception of Maine and Nebraska).  
 
The number of electors due to House representation is approximately proportional to state 
populations, but with the addition of the Senate electors this proportionality relationship is 
weakened. This naturally leads to the question, “Is the frequency of unpopular elections higher 
with the added Senate electors or without?” 
 
A priori, an argument can be made for either outcome: On the one hand, since including the 
Senate electors results in the number of electors apportioned to each state being less proportional 
to state populations, we might expect that Electoral College totals would less accurately reflect 
the overall popular vote than if only the electors due to the House were used; this would then 
result in more unpopular elections with Senate electors than would occur without them.  
 
A counterargument is that the total number S of Senate electors a candidate wins is positively 
correlated with the percentage of the popular vote he or she receives, just as is the total number H 
of electors the candidate receives due to their House electors. Having two factors that are each 
correlated with the popular vote strengthens the association between the total electoral vote and 
the popular vote. Therefore our present system, which uses both H and S (giving H + S electors to 
the candidate), will produce results better aligned with the popular vote than if H alone were used.  
 
Our simulations indicate a clear answer to this question. Figure 2 plots the number of state 
electors S won by the candidate who won the popular vote (which is 2 × the number of states 
won) against the number of House electors H that candidate won. We show the results for only 
2500 simulated elections in order to keep the density of the points shown manageable.  
 
Remembering that considering the District of Columbia as a state with two Senate electors gives 
a Senate of size 102 and House of size 436, we see that points falling to the left of the vertical line 
H = 436/2 = 218 represent simulated outcomes that would be unpopular if the electoral college 
were based only on the House electors. Points falling to the lower left of the slanted line H + S = 
538/2 = 269 correspond to simulated elections that would be unpopular under the present 
electoral system. The most obvious aspect of Figure 2 is that most elections are not unpopular. As 
indicated above, roughly 5% of our simulated elections are unpopular under the present system. 
Figure 2 also shows, not surprisingly, that the great majority of unpopular elections would be 
unpopular under either system (based either on H or H + S).  
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of 2500 elections showing total House and Senate electoral votes for the 
popular winner. The Bush/Gore outcome, (225,42), is also shown. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Regions corresponding to WL, LL and LW. 
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In order to decide which system produces fewer unpopular elections, it suffices to compare the 
incidence of points in the two wedge shaped regions corresponding to WL+LL (popular winner 
loses in the House) and LW+LL (popular winner loses with the Senate included), or more simply 
we can just compare WL and LW. As indicated in the figure, far more simulations fall in the WL 
region than the LW region, which means that unpopular elections are more common when just 
the House electors are used than when both the House and Senate electors are counted. Thus 
granting the extra two votes for Senate electors significantly lessens the likelihood that the 
electoral vote will differ from the popular vote. In our simulations, the popular vote differed from 
the full electoral vote in 0.3 % + 4.7 % = 5.0 % of the trials (LW+LL) and the popular vote 
differed from the House vote in 2.2 % + 4.7 %=  6.9 % of the trials (WL+LL). 
 
One can also simulate elections under alternative rules that add larger numbers of Senate electors 
to the number of House-based electoral votes for each state. Note that increasing the number of 
Senate electors for each state to some large number would essentially result in awarding the 
presidency to the candidate winning the greater number of states.  
 
We can get a good idea of how increasing the number of Senate electors would affect the 
frequency of unpopular elections by looking again at the slanted line in Figure 2. Giving more 
than two Senate electors for each state is tantamount to flattening the line; as the number of 
Senate electors increases, the line rotates counterclockwise towards its limiting position, the 
horizontal line in Figure 2. (The vertical axis would be scaled with different values, but that is 
immaterial.) It’s clear that the frequency of unpopular elections (indicated by the proportion of 
points to the lower left of the slanted line) does not change dramatically as the line rotates; even 
when the number of Senate electors is so large that the winner is the candidate that wins more 
than half of the states, the estimated likelihood of an unpopular election is 6.1%, only about 1% 
higher than what we found under the current system, and lower than with House electors alone. 
This is apparent from Figure 2 in that the number of points below the line S = 51 appears just 
slightly larger than the number of points to the lower left of the line H + S = 269. 
 
 
The National Popular Vote Bill  
 
For another variation recall the National Popular Vote bill mentioned earlier, which would go into 
effect only when enough states have signed on so that they command a majority of electoral votes 
and thus guarantee that the national popular vote winner is the electoral winner. What if states 
instead took action before they commanded a majority?  
 
It is easy to imagine that unpopular elections tend to be fairly close. Figure 4, however, shows the 
frequency of the differences of electoral votes (Democratic electoral votes – Republican electoral 
votes) for all of the unpopular elections under the current system that occurred in our 20,000 
simulations.  
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Figure 4. Frequency distribution of signed electoral differences,  
Democrats electoral votes – Republican electoral votes. 
 
Clearly electoral differences in unpopular elections can often be quite large and so the 
strategy of awarding states’ electoral votes to the popular winner would not reliably 
guarantee the popular winner the election unless states representing a very large number 
of electoral votes are committed to it. Also note in Figure 4 that the majority of the 
electoral differences are positive, which indicates that if future voting patterns are like 
those of the past 50 years, the Democratic candidate is more likely to be the beneficiary 
of an unpopular election than the Republican.  
 
The primary reason for this is that Republican candidates tend to have sizeable majorities 
in states they win, although most are small states. This boosts their overall popular vote 
without necessarily giving them enough large states to win the electoral vote. The most 
striking illustration of the consequences of failing to win in large states is what might be 
called the California effect. Figure 5 codes each simulated election according to whether 
the popular winner was (i) a Democrat or a Republican, and (ii) whether they carried 
California. Note that nearly all of the points in the cluster that lies in the upper left 
quadrant are cases in which the Republican was the popular winner but failed to capture 
California (and lost the electoral vote). As indicated in figure 3 above, the points below 
the slanted line H+S = 269 represent unpopular outcomes. 
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Figure 5. Scatter plot of 1500 elections showing total House and Senate electoral votes for the 
popular winner, by party of popular winner and capitalized if the popular winner wins California.  
 
 
Final Thoughts: The Evolution of the Electoral College 
 
Lastly, we comment that the Electoral College at its inception was not supposed to reflect popular 
will. Alexander Hamilton in Number 68 of the Federalist Papers made it quite clear that a 
popularly elected President was not the intention of the framers. Such an important decision as 
electing the president, in Hamilton’s words, was to be placed in the hands of “men most capable 
of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to 
deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were 
proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from 
the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such 
complicated investigations.” Hamilton might find the point of departure for this paper very much 
inappropriate and contrary to the very idea of the Electoral College. Over time, however, 
presidential elections have become more like popular elections as political parties evolved and 
more states transferred the right “to appoint (electors), in such manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct” to the people of the states by allowing them to vote for the electors directly. Today, 
in many states the names of electors are not even printed on the ballot anymore; only the 
candidates for President and Vice President are listed on the ballots. The Electoral College today 
is functioning very differently than originally imagined by the framers of the constitution.    
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Appendix: Principal Components Analysis Details 
  
We wish to exploit the correlations that exist between states’ voting patterns to determine the core 
structure of the elections data. We represent all the data from the last twelve elections as twelve 
51-dimensional vectors of measurements, where the 51 components represent each state’s 
percentages for the Democratic candidate out of the total of Republican and Democratic votes. 
Subtracting the mean of the twelve percentages to center the data produces a 12× 51 matrix of 
deviations which we call Devs. The rank of Devs is at most 11, not 12, since the deviations for 
each state sum to zero.  We write Σ = DevsT Devs, a 51 × 51 matrix of rank at most 11 or n-1.  
Σ/(n-1) is the sample covariance matrix of the state variables; that is, the (i,j)-th element of     
Σ/(n-1) is the sample covariance of the deviations of the ith and jth states. 
 
The principal components are the eleven unit eigenvectors of Σ/(n-1). The eigenvector 
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue represents the direction of maximal variation of the set of 
twelve points in 51-dimensional space, and the eigenvalue is the amount of such variation. More 
precisely, the largest eigenvalue is the variance of the data when it is projected onto the first 
eigenvector. The eigenvector corresponding to the second largest eigenvalue is the direction of 
maximal variation of the set of points in the space orthogonal to the first eigenvector (one can 
think of reducing the dimension of the point cloud by “projecting out” the first direction ), etc. 
Each eigenvector is a linear combination of the 51-dimensional basis vectors (1,0,0,…,0), 
(0,1,0,…,0),…, (0,...,0,1) associated with the 51 states, with coefficients (known as “factor 
loadings”) reflecting the strength of the contribution of each state. These eleven eigenvectors are 
orthonormal. 
 
Our principal components analysis could have been done using an eigenanalysis of the correlation 
matrix rather than the covariance matrix Σ. We chose the covariance matrix for this application 
since the 51 variables are commensurable, each measuring the same quantity for a different state. 
 
